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Policies to tax farmers in low-income countries and 
policies to subsidize them in high-income countries have 
been identified as a major source of the disequilibrium 
of world agriculture. Recently, as many high-performing 
economies in Asia advanced from the low-income to the 
middle-income stage through successful industrialization, 
they have been confronted with the problem of a 
widening income gap between farm and non-farm 
workers corresponding to rapid shifts in comparative 
advantage from agriculture to manufacturing. In order to 
prevent this disparity from culminating in serious social 
and political instability, policies have been reoriented 
This paper—a product of the Trade Team, Developpment Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to 
understand the changing extent, underlying causes and the economic effects of distortions to agricultural incentives faced 
by farmers and poor consumers in developing countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at 
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toward supporting the income of farmers. At the same 
time, governments in middle-income countries must 
continue to secure low-cost food for the urban poor who 
are still large in number. The need to achieve the two 
conflicting goals under the still weak fiscal capacity of 
governments tends to make agricultural policies in the 
middle-income stage tinkering and ineffective. Greater 
research inputs in this area are called for in order to 
prevent the growth momentum of high-performing 
economies in Asia from being disrupted by political 
crises.Paper submitted to the World Bank project on “Distortions to Agricultural Incentives”  
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This paper aims to identify the nature of a new agricultural problem emerging in 
high-performing economies in Asia, as they have advanced from the low-income to a   
middle-income stage. The “agricultural problem” is here defined as a problem of 
overriding concern to policymakers with respect to designing and implementing policies 
for agriculture as part of policies to promote national economic development in their 
country. As such, it may well be called the “basic problem in determining agricultural 
policies”. 
 
For the past half century East Asia has been the growth pole of world economy. Japan’s 
jump from a middle-income to a high-income economy associated with very rapid 
industrialization in two decades from the 1950s was followed by a more compressed 
growth of so-called Asian NIES – Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore – from the 
1960s. Equally remarkable in this period was the advancement of low-income agrarian 
economies in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia and Thailand, to the middle income 
stage. Within three decades from the 1960s they were able to achieve significant 
industrialization with the major share of their export shifted from primary to 
manufactured commodities. Shortly after the take-off of these high-performing 
economies in the Association of South-East Asia (ASEAN), China began to rise to “the 
workshop of the world” with its successful market-oriented reforms. This experience has 
been followed by another transitional economy in East Asia, Vietnam. Furthermore, it 
appears that this ‘East Asian Miracle’ (World Bank, 1993) is now being transmitted to 
South Asia, where India and Bangladesh have been accelerating economic growth rates 
since the 1990s, though they have not yet escaped from the low-income status. 
 
As high-performing developing economies in Asia have advanced or will advance to a 
middle-income stage, they are bound to face a new agricultural problem. What is the 
nature of this problem? What is its root? What policies might be appropriate and 
effective in solving the problem? These are the questions addressed in this paper.   
 
Following this introduction, Section 2 defines three agricultural problems, each 
corresponding to a major development stage．Section 3 elaborates the political economy 
mechanism giving rise to a unique problem in the middle-income stage, on which 
Section 4 gives a historical perspective in terms of the experiences of Thailand and 
Japan. Section 5 discusses on the relevance of East Asian experience to economies in 
 2other regions. Finally, Section 6 concludes with a plea for more serious research on this 
problem for sustaining development of high-performing economies in Asia.   
 
 
2. Three Agricultural Problems   
 
First, the nature of the agricultural problem in the middle-income stage shall be 
specified in comparison with the problems confronted by the low-income and 
high-income countries.   
 
In his classic treatise, Theodore Schultz (1953) specified the two different agricultural 
problems confronted by low-income and high-income economies. The ‘food problem’ in 
his term is the problem faced by low-income economies; these economies characterized 
by rapid population growth and high food demand elasticity are under the constant risk 
to be beset by shortage in the supply of food relative to the demand; the resulting high 
food prices pull up the costs of living and the wage rates of workers in non-farm sectors 
and thereby suppress industrialization and overall economic growth; therefore, the 
prime policy concern in low-income economies is to prevent the food shortage from 
occurring. Schultz argued that the ‘farm problem’ faced by high-income economies is 
diametrically different form the food problem; population growth slow down and food 
consumption is saturated in the high-income stage, while the food production capacity is 
strengthened due to their ability to advance technology; therefore, high-income 
economies have a chronic tendency for food demand to be exceeded by supply with the 
result that food prices and farm incomes decline; under the powerful lobbying by 
farmers, agricultural policies in high-income economies is mainly geared toward 
preventing farm incomes from falling; their demand for agricultural protection policies 
tends to be easily accepted because high-income consumers are lenient to high food 
prices and farm subsidies. 
 
Later, Schultz (1978) identified these two agricultural problems as underlying the 
policies to exploit or tax agriculture commonly adopted in low-income countries in 
contrast to the policies to protect or subsidize agriculture in high-income countries. His 
hypothesis has been established as a paradigm among agricultural economists as it 
found supports from several empirical studies (Anderson and Hayami, 1986; Hayami, 
1988; Krueger, et al., 1991). Under the serious constraint of foreign exchange common 
among low-income economies, it is generally not feasible for them to counteract food 
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domestic food prices by such means as taxation on food exports, government compulsory 
procurement of farm products from producers at lower-than-market prices and 
accepting foreign food aid for damping in domestic market is commonly practiced in 
low-income countries for securing the supply of cheap food to non-farm workers at the 
expense of farmers. In contrast, policies to raise agricultural product prices by such 
means as border protection and domestic production control are commonly used in 
high-income countries for supporting farmers’ incomes at the expense of consumers and 
taxpayers. In this paper, the agricultural problem underlying policies to depress food 
prices and farm incomes in low-income countries is called the “food problem” following 
Schultz’s terminology, but the agricultural problem underlying policies to support farm 
incomes in high-income countries is called the ‘protection problem’, instead of Schultz’s 
‘farm problem’ or Hayami’s (1988) ‘agricultural adjustment problem’.   
 
Despite the change in terminology, I adopt as the basic framework the Schultz theory on 
the two agricultural problems. In addition, I would propose it useful to identify another 
agricultural problem specifically faced by middle-income countries. This problem is 
brought about by a lag in productivity growth in agriculture behind non-agriculture as a 
result of the successful industrialization that raised these economies to a middle-income 
stage. At this stage as compared with the previous low-income stage, the food supply 
capacity rises and factors causing demand growth are weakened, but people’s per-capita 
incomes do not yet reach a level at which food consumption is completely saturated as in 
the high-income economies. As a result, the terms of trade between agriculture and 
non-agriculture remain largely stable, despite significant decreases in agriculture’s 
productivity relative to non-agriculture due to rapid progress in industrialization. 
Therefore, farmers’ income level tends to decline relative to non-farmers’ corresponding 
to the widening inter-sectoral productivity gap. By observing non-farm workers’ rapid 
escape from poverty, farmers who are left behind begin to realize how poor they are, 
even if their income level did not decrease or even slightly increased from the previous 
stage. Dissatisfaction of farm population on their remaining to be poor despite visible 
improvements in other sectors often becomes a significant source of social instability. 
Thus, at the middle-income stage, it becomes a prime concern of policymakers to 
prevent rural-urban income disparity from widening. This agricultural problem is here 
called the ‘disparity problem’. It is by nature the problem of income disparity between 
the farm and the non-farm sectors.   
 
 4This problem is looming large and will continue to become more serious among 
high-performing economies in Asia as they advance to the middle-income stage upon 
their success in industrialization. 
 
3. The Political Equilibrium of the Disparity Problem   
 
The disparity problem is considered a political equilibrium in which the political 
influences of farm and non-farm interests are more or less balanced. Figure 1 illustrates 
how the objective of politicians in designing agricultural policies changes in the process 
of economic development. The food-problem becomes dominant where politicians’ major 
concern for the sake of their staying in office is how to secure low-price food to urban 
dwellers; and the protection-problem becomes dominant where their major concern is 
how to keep farmers’ income level balanced with non-farm workers. In contrast, the 
disparity-problem emerges where these two concerns are more or less equally 
important.  
  
At the stage in which the disparity problem is dominant, the prime concern of 
politicians is to relieve farmers from poverty. However, ‘poverty’ here means not 
absolute poverty but relative poverty.  Absolute poverty among farm population is less 
severe in middle-income countries than in low-income countries. In the middle-income 
stage, with the progress of industrialization by means of borrowing technology from 
developed countries, newly-risen well-to-do families, including workers employed in 
large-scale modern enterprises, form a new social class in urban areas enjoying a 
modern comfortable life. Observing the income difference from the newly-risen urban 
families, farmers become envious and eventually develop grudge against the social 
system to keep them in poverty, which may culminate in social disruptions.     
 
This relative poverty problem is closely related with the so-called ‘dual structure’ that 
emerged in the process of industrialization. The dual structure refers to the situation 
characterized by the coexistence between a formal sector consisted of large-scale, 
capital-intensive enterprises paying high wages to their employees and an informal 
sector consisted of small-scale, labor-intensive enterprises based on cheap labor. The 
formal sector is largely closed to laborers in the informal sector including employees in 
small-scale enterprises, casual laborers working on a daily contract basis, and 
self-employed manufactures and traders. With labor codes and unions exclusively 
applicable to large-scale enterprises their labor costs are high despite the abundant 
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at work among entrepreneurs in the formal sector to increase capital intensity by 
adopting labor-saving technologies.  As a result, employment increases much slower 
than increases in output.  The income gap tends to widen cumulatively between 
employees in the formal and the informal sectors.   
  
Typically the informal sector functions as a buffer in the labor market. Many 
small-scale enterprises engage in production as subcontractors of large-scale 
enterprises. Since employment in the formal sector is largely permanent, large-scale 
enterprises prefer to reduce order to subcontractors during the economic slump rather 
than to lay off their own employees. Correspondingly, many laborers in the informal 
sector who came from farm households lose work opportunities in cities and are forced 
to return to parents or brothers in home villages. In addition to the economic burden of 
feeding these returnees, farmers face sharp drops in farm product prices during 
recessions because of the low price elasticities characteristic of food demand and supply.   
In this way, during economic recessions, farmers suffer from dire poverty, intensifying 
their grudge against urban people.   
  
Supported by the sympathy of the intelligentsia, farmers’ dissatisfaction may elevate to 
serious anti-governmental movements. So, the government is forced to adopt 
agricultural protection measures.    However, this protection cannot be strong enough to 
fill up the income gap between farmers and urban workers unlike in the high-income 
stage.  Since the shares of agriculture in both national income and labor force still 
remain large, it is impossible for the government in the middle-income stage to secure 
sufficient finance for closing the growing income gap. In addition, increases in food 
prices result in a major damage to a large number of small-scale enterprises in urban 
area, which heavily rely on cheap labor. Developing countries can advance from the 
low-income to the middle-income stage by technology borrowing from developed 
countries. However, the successful industrialization by means of technology borrowing 
tends to result in the formation of the dual structure in the economy and the widening 
of income disparity between farmers and newly-risen urban families. Under the dictate 
of this disparity problem, policymakers in middle-income countries are forced to muddle 
around in search of ways and means to protect farmers within the constraint of the food 
problem that is still binding because a large number of workers in urban informal 
sectors are still absolutely poor. As their Engel coefficients are high, high food prices 
could well raise the cost of living above their meager incomes.   
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The tendency of relative poverty to rise in the middle-income stage can be confirmed in 
Table 1. In Table 1, farmers’ relative income is measured by dividing agriculture’s share 
in GDP by agriculture’s share in employment. In low-income countries, farmer’s relative 
incomes were in the order of 40-60 percent in 2000, which were not so low compared 
with those of middle-income countries. In particular, three African economies, Ghana, 
Nigeria and Kenya, which recorded virtually no economic growth for 1965-2000, 
experienced no significant decrease in farmer’s relative income. In contrast, in India 
and Pakistan, which recorded moderate economic growth, farmer’s relative income 
dropped slightly. In Indonesia and Thailand, which recorded high growth having been 
able to advance from the low-income to the middle-income stage during this period, 
farmer’s relative income declined sharply. It is interesting to observe that, in the 
Philippines that lagged behind East Asian Miracle growth, farmer’s relative income did 
not significantly decrease. Notably, farmer’s relative income increased rather than 
decreased in high-income economies on the average, where the government could afford 
to spend sufficient budgets for supporting farmers’ incomes. 
 
Underlying this widening income gap between farm and non-farm sectors in the 
middle-income stage is the rapid shift in comparative advantage away from agriculture 
to industry, as illustrated in Table 2. In this table, changes in comparative advantages 
are compared among selected countries in terms of labor productivity growth in 
agriculture relative to that of manufacturing. In developed countries, a tendency is 
observed that labor productivity increased faster in the agricultural sector than in the 
manufacturing sector, whereas in developing economies labor productivity in 
manufacturing tended to increase faster than in agriculture. These observations are 
consistent with the hypothesis that comparative advantage in agriculture declined in 
developing countries and increased in developed countries.     
 
Likely underlying this increase in comparative advantage in manufacturing among 
developing countries is the greater difficulty of technology transfer from developed to 
developing countries in agriculture than in manufacturing. Because agricultural 
production is a biological process, it is critically influenced by natural environments 
which are difficult to control artificially.  Therefore, superior farming methods and 
plant varieties developed in advanced countries located in the temperate zone can not 
readily be applied in developing countries under tropical environments. In contrast, 
manufacturing production is largely a mechanical process operated in the controlled 
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developed countries to developing countries. In this way, agriculture’s comparative 
advantage tends to decline in developing countries, especially in middle-income 
countries achieving rapid industrialization by technological borrowing from developed 
countries.  
 
The speed of decline in agriculture’s comparative advantage is likely to exceed the speed 
of labor transfer from agriculture to manufacturing under the regime of emerging dual 
structure characterized by the low rate of labor absorption in the formal sector. To that 
extent the income disparity between farmers and the employees of formal 
manufacturing and service enterprises could well rise to becoming a source of major 
social instability or even disruption. 
 
 
4. Historical Perspectives 
 
A more concrete grasp of the process by which the disparity problem dominates 
agricultural policy formulation as economies advance from the low-income to the 
middle-income stage may be obtained by examining histories of the nations that 
underwent such a transformation. For this purpose the histories of Thailand during the 
period after the Second World War and of Japan between the First and Second World 
Wars shall be reviewed in this section. 
 
The experience of Thailand 
 
First, the experience of Thailand is examined as a typical example of high-performing 
economies in Asia currently experiencing the disparity problem. 
 
Indeed, the growth performance of Thai economy in the past half century was dramatic. 
Before the 1960s, Thailand was a low-income economy dependent on the production and 
export of primary commodities, rice above all. Before 1960, average GDP per capita 
remained largely stagnant at the level of about 500 US dollars (in 1990 prices) with the 
share of industrial products in total export being only about 10 percent (Douangngeune, 
et al., 2005). However, within only two decades from 1960, Thailand suddenly jumped 
up to a middle-income status based on the success of labor-intensive industrialization; 
by the end of the 1970s the export share of industrial products rose to about 40 percent 
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the industrial sector in Thailand was further strengthened, beginning to develop 
high-tech industries such as automobile and electronics. Correspondingly, within only a 
decade and half before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, per-capita GDP again more than 
doubled and the export share of industrial products exceeded 70 percent. Even though 
Thai economy suffered severely from the 1997 Crisis, it was able to return to the track 
of high growth in about three years. 
 
It was inevitable that the rise of Thailand from a low-income to a middle-income 
country based on dramatic industrial development was associated with the widening of 
income disparity between agriculture and the rest of economy, as already observed in 
Table 1. Increasing income disparity between rural and urban sectors should have been 
parallel with the widening income gap between workers in urban formal and informal 
sectors. The disparity increased as the development of capital- and knowledge-intensive 
industries created a dual structure. Altogether, inequality in income distribution in 
Thailand, as measured by the Gini coefficient in Figure 2, increased significantly as the 
economy advanced to the middle-income stage. 
 
In this process both farmers and workers in the urban informal sector were not 
absolutely worse off. Instead, they should have improved their absolute income levels, 
as reflected in continued reduction in the share of population below the poverty line (the 
head-count index) despite increases in the Gini coefficient. Nevertheless, they must 
have developed frustration on their being poor or becoming poorer in comparison with 
the rising standard of living of formal-sector employees. Thus, upon successful 
reduction of absolute poverty, Thailand began to be confronted with the problem of 
relative poverty. 
 
Since the majority of the poor were staking out subsistence in agriculture, policies to 
support farmers’ incomes became important agenda for politicians to prevent income 
inequality from rising to a socially disastrous level. Also, the spread of primary 
education and the improvements of communication and transportation infrastructure in 
rural areas increased both farmers’ awareness of their being ‘unfairly’ treated relative to 
urban dwellers as well as their ability of organizing political lobbies for demanding a 
‘fair deal’. Thus, in the process of advancing from a low-income to a middle-income stage, 
Thai politicians were pressed to change their policy objective from taxing agriculture for 
solving the food problem to supporting farmers for solving the disparity problem. 
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This change in policy orientation in Thailand is most clearly observable in changes in 
taxation on rice exports. As a major exporter of rice, taxation on rice exports 
represented a convenient and effective instrument for taxing agriculture for the purpose 
of income transfer from farm producers to consumers and taxpayers. Several 
instruments were used for taxing rice exports in Thailand, including quantitative 
restriction (export quota) and imposition of obligations on exporters to submit a certain 
share of rice export to the government at lower-than-market prices (so-called ‘rice 
reserve requirement’), all of which had the effect of lowering domestic prices below 
international prices. However, by far the most important instrument used by Thai 
government was the ‘rice premium’, a kind of specific duty levied proportional to export 
quantities. At the low-income stage, the rice premium was a critically important source 
of government revenue and, at the same time, acted as a mechanism of supplying rice to 
domestic consumers at lower-than-world market prices. Further, it had the power to 
protect consumers from the vagary of world market by increasing (reducing) the 
premium when world market prices rose (dropped) so as to stabilize domestic prices. 
Thus, the rice premium was a highly effective policy instrument to serve for the dual 
purpose of raising government revenue and securing supply of cheap food to urban 
consumers by means of taxing agriculture at the stage when the food problem was 
dominant in the formulation of agricultural policies (Siwamwalla, 1987; Siwamwalla 
and Sethboonsarny, 1989). 
 
Figure 3 draws changes in rice premium in comparison with changes in the nominal 
rate of protection (NRP). NRP aims to measure the divergence of the domestic price 
from the border price. Here it is calculated as the rate of difference of the domestic 
wholesale price from the export price, fob, Bangkok, for the grade of rice 5-percent 
broken. To the extent that rice exports are taxed, domestic prices diverge below border 
export prices, resulting in the negative values of NRP. NRP includes the effects of not 
only the rice premium but also other taxation instruments, but the dominant role of the 
premium is evident from high negative correlation between movements in the premium 
rate and NRP. Data in Figure 3 show that, before the mid 1970s when Thailand stayed 
in a low-income stage, the rice premium rate remained high at the level of about 30 
percent of the border price, and NRP was as high as about 50 percent; this implies that 
nearly half the values of farmers’ rice sales were transferred to non-farm sectors 
including the government through the export taxation. For a decade since then, however, 
as Thailand had advanced to the middle-income stage, the rice premium had been 
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disparity problem. 
 
Beside the reduction of export taxation, the emerging need to prevent rural-urban 
disparity from further widening pressed politicians to install more visible measures for 
the support of farmers. Under the political instability in the mid1970s involving student 
riots and military coups, this pressure culminated in the establishment of the Farmers’ 
Aid Fund in 1974. Based on large rice premium revenue corresponding to sharp 
increases in world rice prices in the so-called ‘World Food Crisis’ of 1973-75, the Fund 
tried to undertake several programs to support farmers, such as farmer credit, fertilizer 
subsidy, and public work using rural labor for the construction of rural infrastructure. 
Among them a program organized in a significant scale attempted to support rice prices 
through the purchase of rice by government agencies. However, the program totally 
failed to achieve its intended goal, partly because the poor design and inefficient 
implementation due to lack of experience and skill in government procurement agencies 
but more critically because the budget that the Fund could allocate was too small to 
significantly influence market prices (Siwamwalla, 1987). This program was soon 
terminated as the rice premium revenue decreased corresponding to declines in world 
rice prices after the Food Crisis period. 
 
This failure of the price support program organized by the Farmers’ Aid Fund 
epitomizes the difficulty in formulating appropriate policies to cope with the disparity 
problem. First of all, the program was contradictory as it tried to support farmers based 
on the revenue from taxation on them; this contradiction arose from the fact that the 
government tax base outside agriculture was still insufficient to support farmers 
adequately in the middle-income stage. Second, if the program were really successful in 
raising domestic rice prices, it should have met strong opposition and protest from the 
urban poor outside the formal sector. Here is the dilemma of the disparity problem 
under which supplying cheap food to the urban poor and preventing farmers from 
becoming poorer relative to non-farm workers are more or less important for politicians. 
 
It must be very difficult for middle-income countries to escape from this dilemma. 
Thailand, for example, tried to introduce export subsidy on rice for further increasing 
support on farmers after the abolishment of rice premium. As yet, however, the export 
subsidy has been negligibly small. The large application of export subsidy would not 
have been possible as it is against the WTO rule. However, even before the GATT 
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expand the export subsidy scheme. This was presumably because of both the budgetary 
constraint and the danger to raise food prices for the urban poor.   
 
Since the mid1980s, the Thai government has introduced a commodity credit program 
akin to a program operated by the Commodity Credit Corporation in the United States 
in the past. By this program farmers can receive low-interest loans from the 
government for the pledge of their rice until the rice price will go up to a target level and, 
in the event that the price will not sufficiently rise, they can relinquish their debt by 
submitting the pledged rice to the government. This is a high-cost program 
unsustainable even in the United States. It is doubtful if this program can be expanded 
to such a scale as to render sufficient income supports for farmers in a middle-income 
country. 
 
As industrialization in Thailand will continue to progress, comparative advantage in 
agriculture will decline further. For closing the rural-urban income gap, the government 
will continue to increase supports on farmers in various fronts, including subsidies on 
inputs and credits as well as price supports. Yet, it is unlikely that Thailand will able to 
expand the support programs to such a scale as to fully close the income gap before its 
economy will advance to a high-income stage.   
 
The experience of Japan 
 
The current problem in Thailand at the middle-income stage, as reviewed in the 
previous section, may be better understood by comparing it with the economic 
transformation of Japan from the low-income to the high-income stage. Table 3 presents 
a synopsis of modern economic development in Japan from 1885 to 1995. Japan and 
Thailand opened to international trade at about the same time under the pressure of 
West; both were forced to sign unequal treaties – Thailand with the United Kingdom in 
1855 and Japan with the United States in 1858. Despite this similarity, 
industrialization progressed much faster in Japan than in Thailand, probably owing to 
much scarcer endowments of natural resources, especially land for cultivation, making 
it more urgent in Japan to industrialize than in Thailand for surviving under open 
international trade (Bounlouane, et al., 2005). At any rate, in terms of per-capita GDP 
data in Table 3 (Column 1), it appears that Japan was able to approach the 
middle-income stage by the first decade of the 20 century. Until the First World War, 
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labor-intensive manufacturing. Later, heavy industries were promoted during the First 
World War and continued to be strengthened thereafter in the inter-war period. At that 
time a dual structure emerged and the rural-urban disparity became serious. 
 
Correspondingly, the focus of agricultural policies changed. Before the First World War, 
agricultural policies were mainly geared for increasing food production so as to 
counteract the food problem in the low-income stage. The adequate supply of cheap food, 
especially rice, was considered a critical support for the development of labor-intensive 
industries. For this end Japanese government invested heavily in agricultural research 
and extension as well as irrigation infrastructure for the development and diffusion of 
high-yielding varieties, initially within Japan and later to overseas territories, Korea 
and Taiwan. Such efforts were successful to overcome the food problem before the 
Second World War (Hayami, 1975; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985, Hayami and Yamada, 
1991). 
 
Ironically, this success greatly aggravated the disparity problem during the inter-war 
period. As Column 5 of Table 3 shows, declines in labor productivity in agriculture’ 
relative to industry were very fast in Japan from the beginning of modern economic 
growth, reflecting very rapid progress in industrialization. Nevertheless, the terms of 
trade did not improve for agriculture (Column 6), so that income per capita in farmers’ 
households declined sharply relative to that in non-farm workers’ households (Column 
7). These trends contrast sharply with those after the Second World War, when despite 
continued declines in relative productivity for agriculture, the per-capita income of 
farmers improved relative to non-farmers to the point of exceeding parity after the 
1970s: this was resulted from very rapid improvements in the terms of trade based on 
farm price support programs at a large scale unthinkable in the prewar days. Such a 
scale of farm supports became possible as Japan advanced to the high-income stage in 
the  late  1960s.     
 
As the disparity problem loomed large, the farm bloc demanded for increased 
government supports. Already in 1913, politically powerful landlords were successful in 
lobbying for the institution of a specific duty on rice imports, but it was not applied to 
rice produced in overseas territories within the Japanese Empire. When the price of rice 
began to fall after the First World War, the farm bloc pressed the government to support 
rice prices by means of procurement and storage of rice. In addition, the government 
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construction of physical infrastructure in rural areas in order to provide wage-earning 
opportunities and the release of low-interest loans from government to farmers heavily 
in debt from private money lenders.   
 
Tax burden on farmers was also reduced. In the early stage of modernization in Japan, 
land tax levied from farmers was the major source of government revenue. During the 
1880s the ratio of direct tax shouldered by farmers to their income was about 15 percent 
compared with only about 2 percent for non-farmers; this disparity largely remained 
even in the 1910s with the tax rates of about 11 percent for farmers and 5 percent for 
non-farmers, but by the late 1930s farmers’ tax rate was reduced to about 6 percent not 
so different from non-farmers (Hayami, 1988, p.40).   
 
These policies designed in Japan during the inter-war period in response to the 
emerging disparity problem were also very similar to those adopted Thailand since 
1970s. Their consequences were similar. In spite of all these efforts, the level of income 
and the living standard of farm people did not appreciably improve. Unlike after the 
Second World War, Japanese economy during the inter-war period did not reach the 
stage at which the government could afford to undertake farm support programs at 
such a scale as to close the rural-urban income gap. Although heavy industries 
developed rapidly, light industries based on small- and medium-scale enterprises were 
still the backbone of Japanese economy, especially with respect to foreign exchange 
earnings. Their international competitive power was still dependent on cheap labor, so 
that a major increase in the wage rate resulting from large increases food prices could 
not be tolerated. In such circumstances, with whatever powerful lobbying the landlords 
were able to organize, it was not politically possible to raise the level of agricultural 
protection sufficiently to solve the rising disparity problem. 
 
Very unfortunately, by the time when the disparity problem became serious, Japan was 
plunged into the storm of the Great Depression that began in 1929. In Japan as well as 
throughout the world, farm product prices declined faster than the prices of 
manufactures and farmers’ incomes dropped more than non-farm workers’. Growing 
dissatisfaction and frustration of farmers, who became poorer both absolutely and 
relatively, culminated in social disruptions including terrorism; this rendered a major 
support for militarism to gain power, ending in the tragedy of the Pacific War.   
 
 145. On the Relevance of the East Asian Experience 
 
So far, the process of the disparity problem to emerge in developing economies as they 
advance from the low-income to the middle-income stage as the result of successful 
industrialization has been illustrated with respect to the experience of high-performing 
economies in East Asia. One may wonder how relevant is the model based on the East 
Asian experience to economies in other regions with different economic and social 
conditions. Is it not possible that the disparity problem in other regions might not 
become quite as severe as in East Asia, even if they might be able to achieve rapid 
industrialization comparable to that of East Asia? This possibility depends on their 
capability of inter-industry adjustment to the loss in comparative advantage in 
agriculture owing to rapid industrial development.   
 
First, even if the productivity of manufacturing in an economy might rise very rapidly 
owing to the success in the borrowing of advanced industrial technology from abroad in 
association with increases in capital intensity, as has been the case in the East Asian 
Miracle, the loss in agriculture’s comparative advantage might not be so large if it can 
achieve agricultural technology borrowing at a comparable speed. For example, if the 
agriculture sector were able to achieve its productivity growth by means of farm 
mechanization parallel with increases in the capital intensity in the manufacturing 
sector, inter-sectoral productivity difference could have not been widened so much. 
However, even if investment in farm mechanization may become profitable in terms of 
increased wage rates resulting from successful industrialization, the farm 
mechanization might not proceed smoothly because of the difficulty to establish a 
sufficiently large-sized farms to exploit the advantage of using modern large-scale 
machinery under the high transaction costs involved in consolidating a large number of 
peasants’ holdings into large commercial farms.. In East Asia, such as Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan in particular, in which agriculture has traditionally been manned by small 
homogeneous peasants who had been attached to the same lands over generations, it is 
very costly to alienate them form their ancestral lands. These economies are also 
characterized by high population density where frontiers have long been closed for 
opening new lands for cultivation.  In such economies, it should be extremely difficult 
to counteract against loss in agriculture’s comparative advantage by promoting an 
agrarian structure dominated by large-scale commercial farms. Such agrarian 
restructuring could be relatively easier in land-abundant newly settled regions such as 
Latin America where land and labor markets are more fluid and the aggregate supply of 
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problem could be less severe to emerge in such economies than in Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan even at the same speed of industrialization.   
 
Such a difference could well be significant, but it is unlikely that even newly-settled 
land-abundant economies where land markets are usually more active can totally 
escape from the trap of the disparity problem in the process of industrialization. Unlike 
the manufacturing sector where adjustments in factor combination necessary for the 
borrowing of foreign technology can easily be done based on the efficient supply of 
capital from both domestic and foreign sources through generally well-functioning 
capital markets, adjustments in land input needed for introducing foreign agricultural 
technology is much more difficult and costly, given the typical absence in developing 
economies of institutions to support land markets such as cadastral surveys and land 
registry, not to speak of the total absence of “international markets for lands” unlike the 
case for capital. Furthermore, as emphasized in section 4, the importation of foreign 
technology is usually much more difficult for agriculture than for manufacturing 
because of the location-specific nature of agricultural technology that is constrained by 
natural environments (Hayami and Ruttan 1985). For these reasons it is just unlikely 
that even the economies most favourably endowed with agricultural resources can be 
immune from the trap of the disparity problem when they are able to achieve rapid 
industrialization based on the success in industrial technology borrowing, 
 
In fact, Thailand represents a good example in this regard. Within East Asia, Thailand 
has been characterized by relative abundance in the endowment of land where land 
frontiers had been open until very recently, especially in its North East. Nevertheless, 
Thailand could not escape from the disparity problem when it joined the East Asian 
Miracle of rapid industrialization and economic growth, as explained in the previous 
section. The policy response of Thailand to the disparity problem is also representative 
of land abundant economies. As a means to support farmers, Thailand relied heavily on 
the reduction of rice export tax, unlike the cases of Japan, Korea and Taiwan which 
relied on border protection measures such as tariffs and quotas. As a major exporter of 
agricultural commodities, it was not a viable option for Thailand to support farmers by 
raising domestic prices by the combination of border protection and domestic price 
support programs. If domestic prices may be raised above the international market 
prices, Thailand’s exports of agricultural commodities should have stopped, resulting in 
the accumulation of surplus agricultural products in domestic markets to the point that 
 16the cost needed to reduce the surplus by such means as the government’s stock holding 
and acreage control will exceed the nation’s fiscal capacity. For this reason, it was only 
natural for Thailand to adopt reduction on agricultural export taxation as a major 
means to support farmers in a way similar to many land-abundant agricultural 
exporters in Latin America.   
 
Needless to say that the basic cause of the disparity problem is the lag in the transfer of 
labor from agriculture to non-agriculture relative to the speed of loss in agriculture’s 
comparative advantage in the process of industrialization. Therefore, the problem can 
be less severe where the access of farmers to non-farm employment is easier, which 
depends to a large extent on the geographic distribution of industrial and commercial 
activities. This effect can be clearly observed from the comparison between Korea and 
Taiwan within East Asia. Taiwan is known for the success of rural-based 
industrialization characterized by the wide diffusion of small- and medium-scale 
enterprises over rural areas, while Korea’s industrialization has centered on 
urban-based large enterprises. The access of farmers and their family members to 
nonfarm employment has been much easier in Taiwan than in Korea, as reflected in the 
data that more than a half of farm-household income in Taiwan came from non-farm 
sources in 1970 whereas it was only about one quarter in Korea (Honma and Hayami 
2006).  
 
Correspondingly, government responses to the disparity problem were different. Both 
Korea and Taiwan entered the middle-income stage from the 1960s, when border 
protection measures on the import of agricultural commodities were strengthened in 
both economies reflecting governments’ responses to the emergence of the severe 
disparity problem. This aspect of agricultural protection growth was shared common by 
Korea and Taiwan, which recorded similar successes in industrial growth under similar 
resource endowments and agrarian structures. Nevertheless, agricultural protection in 
Korea ,as measured by the average nominal rate of protection for agricultural 
commodities, rose faster to much higher levels than in Taiwan for the same levels of 
per-capita incomes throughout their middle-income stage and further after they 
advanced to the high-income stage in the 1990s (Honma and Hayami 2006). This 
difference seems to reflect the difference in the cost of inter-sectoral adjustments in 
labor allocation corresponding to changes in comparative advantage, which farmers had 
to shoulder. In Korea the shift of labor from agriculture to non-agriculture necessarily 
involved the migration of workers from rural to urban areas, whereas in Taiwan much 
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in their home villages. Correspondingly, both the pecuniary and psychological costs of 
inter-sectoral labor reallocation should have been much higher for farmers in Korea.       
 
The experience of Korea relative to Taiwan suggests the great difficulty that China will 
have to face. The miraculous growth of China in recent years has been characterized by 
concentration of industrial activities in the coastal areas whereas western hinterlands 
have largely been bypassed. As the result, the disparity problem has been especially 
serious and is expected to become more so in China since the rural-urban income gap is 
augmented by the large inter-regional inequality in the process of rapid 
industrialization. It is feared if the disparity problem in China might escalate to the 
social and political crisis of the nature similar to that experienced by Japan between the 
two world wars if the present course of its development continues. 
   
6. Conclusion   
 
The growing imbalance in world agriculture today is epitomized in the increasing food 
deficits in low-income economies in contrast with increasing surpluses in high-income 
economies. This has not simply been the result of different demand and supply 
structures corresponding to different income levels. The problem has been aggravated 
by policies under the dictate of the three agricultural problems in different stages of 
economic development -- the food problem in the low-income stage, the disparity 
problem in the middle-income stage, and the protection problem in the high-income 
stage. 
 
Under the regime of the food problem, policymakers in low-income countries have been 
inclined to adopt policies geared for securing low-priced food to urban consumers at the 
expense of farm producers. In contrast, under the regime of the protection problem, 
politicians in high-income countries have not been able to resist pressures from the 
farm lobby for instituting policies to raise farmers’ incomes to the level of non-farm 
workers. Great inefficiency and inequity resulting from these contrasting policy 
distortions have already been amply documented (Johnson, 1973: Schultz, 1978, 
Anderson and Hayami, 1986), and the need to reduce these distortions has been widely 
recognized. In fact, major international collaborative efforts have progressed in that 
direction for the past two decades, through GATT/WTO multilateral trade negotiations. 
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growing income disparity between the farm and non-farm population could be a major 
source of social and political instability for economies attempting to achieve catching up 
with high-income economies through industrialization by means of rapid technology 
borrowing. This problem is now spreading over Asia from ASEAN nations to China and 
Vietnam and will eventually reach South Asia, especially India.   
 
While the right approaches to the food and protection problems have already been 
established among economists, though actual implementation is often politically 
difficult, the right design to cope with the disparity problem has not yet been identified. 
The difficulty is how to compromise the conflicting goals to support farmers’ incomes on 
the one hand and to secure the supply of low-cost food to a large number of workers in 
urban informal sectors on the other hand under the still weak capacity of the 
government to raise sufficient revenue from non-agricultural sectors. Almost inevitably, 
agricultural policies tend to become tinkering exercises combining various, often 
mutually conflicting policy instruments in ad hoc manners, as the experiences of 
Thailand and Japan illustrate. 
 
Greater research inputs in this area are called for in order to prevent the growth 
momentum of high-performing Asian economies from being disrupted, as experienced 
by Japan between the two World Wars. Given the weak fiscal capacity of developing 
economies at the middle-income stage, it is unrealistic to expect that they can solve the 
problem by means of increasing subsidies to farmers as attempted by high-income 
economies. Policy must be designed to strengthen their capacity to adjust to changes in 
comparative advantage resulting from the lag in the growth of agricultural productivity 
behind the industrial productivity growth. Greater investments in public research and 
development of agricultural technology shall be needed, especially in the direction to 
adapt advanced agricultural technology in developed economies to the environments of 
developing economies as well as in the development of institutional infrastructure such 
as land registry systems for operating land market more efficiently. The education and 
training of rural people will be critically important for shifting rural labor smoothly 
from farm to non-farm economic activities. Industrial development policy should 
consider the need to support rural-based industries for facilitating access of farmers to 
non-farm income sources. 
 
These policies must be supported by the accurate grasp of the nature and scope of 
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based on micro household surveys is badly needed. Unless comparisons between farm 
and non-farm households are made in terms of aggregates of farm and non-farm 
incomes across regions and over time, the effective allocation of public resources to cope 
with the disparity problem by region can not appropriately be designed. The sectoral 
value added data from social accounts used for broad comparisons in Tables 1 of this 
paper are grossly insufficient for the purpose of such concrete policy design. Social 
engineering to cope with the disparity problem, which is by nature very complex and 
sensitive, must be based on careful field–level research for different socio-economic and 
ecological environments, such as those presented in the set of papers compiled in the 
November 2006 special issue on “the role of nonfarm income in poverty reduction: 
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 22Table 1 In te rn a tional  co m pariso ns o f relati ve i nc o m e s o f agricul tural workers across di ff erent  stages of  econom i c
devel opm ent
2000 1965 2000 1965 2000 1965 2000
Developing countries
Low-income countries
Ghana 251 -0.2 62 57 44 36 70 63
Nigeria 358 0.3 72 33 55 29 76 86
Kenya 414 1.3 87 75 35 32 41 43
India 450 2.5 74 60 45 25 61 41
Pakistan 531 2.4 65 47 40 26 62 55
Average
a 401 1.3 72 54 44 30 62 58
Middle-income countries
Indonesia 800 4.1 71 48 56 16 79 32
     China 949 6.6 80 67 38 15 47 22
Philippines 1,002 1.1 61 40 26 16 43 40






South Africa Rep. 3,020 0.3 34 10 9 3 27 34
    Chile 4,917 2.7 27 16 9 5 32 30
Mexico 5,935 1.9 49 21 14 4 28 20
Average
d 2,660 3.1 58 37 26 10 42 28
Developed countries
    Korea 10,884 6.3 55 10 39 5 71 49





























Notes  (1)GDP is converted by the average official exchange rate reported by the International Monetary Fund. 
(2) Economically active population in agriculture (agricultural labour force) is that part of the economically active
population engaged in or seeking work in agriculture, hunting, fishing or forestry.
(3) Agriculture corresponds to divisions 1-5 of the International Standard Industrial Classification
and includes foestry and fishing.
a. Simple average of Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, India and Pakistan.
b. 1968-2000 growth rate.
c. 1968 value.
d. Simple average of Indonesia, China, Philippines, Thailand, South Africa Republic, Chile and Mexico.
e. 1971 value.
f. Simple average of Spain, France, Canada, UK, US and Japan.





















World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM, 2006.  
 23Table 2 The average annual growth rates of real labor productivities in agriculture and
manufacturing in selected countries, 1980-95
（1） （２） (3)
Per-capita GDP Average growth rate per year 
(US$) of labor productivity (%)
Agriculture Manufacturing
Developing countries
Kenya 414 -0.1 0.4 -0.5
India 450 2.3 4.3 -2.0
Pakistan 531 3.1 3.3 -0.2
China 949 3.7 5.1 -1.4
Philippines 1,002 0.4 10.7 -10.3
Turkey 2,956 0.8 4.8 -4.0
South Africa Rep. 3,020 0.9 0.6 0.3
Mexico 5,935 1.5 3.5 -2.0
Average
a 1,907 1.6 4.1 -2.5
Developed countries
Korea 10,884 6.6 6.7 -0.2
Spain 14,338 4.5 3.5 1.1
France 22,548 4.5 2.3 2.1
Canada 23,220 5.8 2.6 3.2
UK 24,075 2.0 3.9 -1.9
US 34,599 2.2 3.5 -1.3
Japan 37,409 3.9 1.9 2.0
Average
b 23,868 4.2 3.5 0.7




a. Simple average of Kenya, India, Pakistan, China, Philippines, Turkey, South Africa
Republic and Mexico.
b. Simple average of Korea, Spain, France, Canada, UK, US and Japan.
Sources United Nations Industrial Development Organization (1997), Industrial Development Global
Report, 1997 Edition．FAO,　FAOSTAT　Database,　2005．
Productivity in the manufacturing sector is measured by UNIDO's industrial production
index divided by employment in the manufacturing sector.  For China, for which UNIDO’s
industrial production index is not available, value added of the manufacturing sector (in
1990 US dollars) is used.
Productivity in the agricultural sector is measured by FAO's index of agricultural
production divided by the economically active population (or labour force) in agriculture.
(4) = （2）－（3）




 24 Table 3  Farm-nonfarm income disparity agriculture in Japan's ec
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agriculture/
 GDP Share of  Industry Tariff rate    
onomic development, 1885-2000
(5) (6) (7)
Agriculture/ Farm / Non-
Aver
per capita  agriculture labour of rice rate
(ppp at 2000) in GDP productivity p
ratio
(US$)  (%) (%) (%)
1885 1,092 45 75 -   
1890 1,285 48 67 -   
1900 1,498 39 49 -   
1910 1,656 32 37 13.7
1920 2,154 30 50 9.9
1930 2,350 18 31 14.0
1935 2,693 18 24 41.2
1955 3,519 21 55 -   
1960 5,063 13 39 -   
1970 12,337 6 25 -   
1980 17,056 4 25 -   
1990 23,580 2 26 -   
2000 26,220 1 22 778
GDP per capita in PPP at 2000 from World Bank, World Development In
in OECD Development Centre, The World Economy : Historical Statistics
The share of agriculture in nominal GDP. 1885-1955 from Ohkawa and S
1885-1935). 1960-2000 from World Development Indicators 2006.
1985-1960: the ratio between the price index of agricultural products and
products in K. Ohkawa, et al. eds., Long-Term Economic Statistics in Jap
Shimposha,1967, pp.165 and192-3. 1970-80: extended from 1960 using
and Fishery’s price index of agricultural products and the Bank of Japan’
index for manufacturing industry products.
1885-1935: the ratio in household income per household member betwee
T. Otsuki and N. Takamatsu, On the measurement of Income Inequali
Development Center of Japan, 1982. 1955-2000: the ratio in per-capita
employees’ households based on the Ministry of Agriculture’s Farm Hous
Ministry of Internal Affairs’ National Survey of Family Income and Expen
exclude non-commercial farm households.
The ratio of real GDP per worker in agriculture (including forestry and fish
industry (including mining). 1885-1970 from Y. Hayami, Nogo Keizairon (
1986, p.120. 1980-2000: extended from 1970 using real GDPs from Annu
Tariffs for 1910, 1920, 1930 and 1935 are tariffs in 1908. 1918, 1928 an
et al. eds., Long-Term Economic Statistics in Japan since 1868, Toyo Kei
for 2000 is ad valorem tariff equivalent of specific duty, 341 yen/kg, wh
government.
Tariffs for 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930 and 1935 are tariffs in 1898, 1908. 19
K. Ohkawa, et al. eds., Long-Term Economic Statistics in Japan since 18
Tariffs for1955-2000 are average tariffs caliculated by total tariff revenue as 
in the Monthly Report of Financial Statistics, Ministry of Finance, variou
age tariff   Manufacturing farm house-
 of all       Terms of  hold income
roducts       Trade ratio
(%) (1885=100) (%)
-    100 76












dicators 2006, linked with the series
, 2003.
hinohara, pp.273-81(share in NNP for
 the price index of manufacturing
an since 1868, Toyo Keizai
 the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry
s domestic corporate goods price
n farm and non-farm households in
ty in Prewar Japan, International
 income between farm households and
ehold Economy Survey and the
diture. Farm households in 1990-2000
ery) to real GDP per worker in
Agricultural Economics), Iwanami,
al Reports of National Accounts.
d 1933, respectively, from K. Ohkawa,
zai, Shimposha, 1967.  Tariffs rate
ich was reported to WTO by the
18, 1928 and 1933, respectively, from
68, Toyo Keizai, Shimposha, 1967.
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Fig. 2 GDP growth and poverty indexes in Thailand, 1962-2001 
 
Note: Within parenthesis is the year of observation. 
Sources:  Reproduced  from  Hayami and Godo(2005.p.208): 
GDP per capita from World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM, 
2003. 
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Fig 3.  Rice premium and nominal rate of protection (NRP) for 
rice 5% broken in Thailand, 1950-2002 
Note:  NRP= (domestic wholesale price – export price fob Bangkok)/ export price fob 
Bangkok 
Source:  
Export price:    IRRI World Rice Statistics (2003)         
Domestic price: Churchart (1957) for 1950-54, IRRI World Rice Statistics (2003) for 
1955-97, and The Bank of Thailand Monthly Bulletin for 1998-2002   
Rice premium: Churchart (1957), Pookkachatikul and Welsch (1976), and Siamwalla 
and  Sethboonsarng  (1989)      
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